Multimode retail system

ABSTRACT

A multimode system for receiving data in a retail environment includes: a secure input module for receiving high security input and low security input from a customer, the high security input to be communicated by the secure input module in cipher text, and the low security input to be communicated by the secure input module in plaintext. The multimode system is adapted to operate in a high security mode and a low security mode. The multimode system is adapted to enter the low security mode upon detection by the multimode system of a security breach condition. In the high security mode, the secure input module accepts low security input and high security input. In the low security mode, the secure input module accepts the low security input and does not accept the high security input.

CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATION

This application is a continuation of U.S. application Ser. No.14/297,711 entitled “Multimode Retail System”, filed Jun. 4, 2014, whichis a continuation of U.S. application Ser. No. 13/170,263 entitled“Multimode Retail System”, filed Jun. 28, 2011 which is a U.S.Non-Provisional Application of U.S. Provisional Application No.61/359,095, entitled “Multimode Retail System”, filed Jun. 28, 2010,which is herein incorporated by reference in its entirety.

TECHNICAL FIELD

This disclosure relates to a system and method for operating a fueldispenser input module, and more particularly to operating a fueldispenser secure input module in multiple security modes.

BACKGROUND

In recent years, retail environments have evolved into elaboratepoint-of-sale (POS) facilities providing a wide variety of customerservices, such as fuel dispensing, car washing, ATM access, money orderaccess, and credit/debit card transactions. Additionally, it has becomedesirable to offer advertisements and additional sales to customers fromthird party venders at the retail environments. However, there has notbeen an ideal system or method available to retailers providing theseadditional capabilities without raising a significant risk ofunauthorized access.

In a traditional retail environment, card data supplied from a customerpurchasing products or services is transmitted in an unprotected formfrom the input system to the POS system, and from the POS system to anetwork host which performs authentication of the card data. This designallows unauthorized parties to easily intercept customer card data bytampering with the transmission line, especially if the transmissionline is Ethernet or a satellite link.

As unauthorized access has become an increasing problem, a number ofgovernment and industry agencies have begun proposing stricterguidelines and requirements for retail environment security. One type ofenhanced security restriction is the physical requirement that displayswithin retail environments should directly interface with a securemodule in order to allow the secure module to control the PIN entrydevice (PED). Another security requirement is that the PED must controlthe prompts that request the entry of PINs and clear-text data. Further,the PED must set a direct interface between the PED keypad and thesecure module when a prompt requests the entry of a PIN or otherclear-text data. Once the direct interface is set, these PEDs musteither (1) be able to cryptographically authenticate all prompts thatrequest the entry of PINs and clear-text data originating from the POSterminal before being displayed or (2) store the prompts in the PED toprevent them from being modified. The idea behind these requirements isthat they would synchronize the display on the screen to the state ofthe PED, thus preventing attacks such as where the PED is in aclear-text data entry mode while the PED displays a command requestingthe entry of secure information. In these situations, the customer wouldenter his or her PIN at a time when the PED would not encrypt the data,thus leading to potential PIN exposure to unauthorized parties.

These requirements leave solution providers with two undesirableoptions. In the first, the retail environment must have two displays—onefor the normal retail environment interface/video that is not “secured,”and another display which would be directly connected to the PED andwould only perform PIN/secure prompt functions. This solution isundesirable because it is likely to cause customer confusion and couldlead to the multiple screens becoming out of sync. The second solutionis to redesign the existing retail environments with a secure chipcontrolling the display. A major downside to this solution is the lossof enhanced video display support because the video accelerator requiredfor the enhanced video display would not be a secure chip. Additionally,software for the new platform would require an expensive andtime-consuming redesign, adding significant cost and complexity to thesystem while simultaneously reducing the functionality available to andrequired by customers.

A PED that functions to receive both PINs and clear-text data can beconfigured to encrypt PIN information, and pass clear-text data inclear-text form. A PED of such type can provide a customer with a singleinterface for entering alpha-numeric information regardless of thesecurity policy associated with information.

SUMMARY

In one general embodiment, a multimode system for receiving data in aretail environment includes: a secure input module for receiving highsecurity input and low security input from a customer, the high securityinput to be communicated by the secure input module in cipher text, andthe low security input to be communicated by the secure input module inplaintext. The multimode system is adapted to operate in a high securitymode and a low security mode. The multimode system is adapted to enterthe low security mode upon detection by the multimode system of asecurity breach condition. In the high security mode, the secure inputmodule accepts low security input and high security input. In the lowsecurity mode, the secure input module accepts the low security inputand does not accept the high security input.

In some aspects of the general embodiment, the low security mode may beselected from a plurality of low security modes.

In some aspects of the general embodiment, the multimode system mayfurther include a non-secure input module which accepts low securityinput in the low security mode and in the high security mode.

In some aspects of the general embodiment, the multimode system mayfurther include a second secure input module which accepts low securityinput and high security input in the low security mode and in the highsecurity mode.

In some aspects of the general embodiment, the multimode system mayfurther include a customer display which displays a limited functionmessage to customers when the multimode system is in the low securitymode.

In some aspects of the general embodiment, the limited function messagemay include instructions to initiate a transaction at another location.

In some aspects of the general embodiment, the limited function messagemay include a listing of payment types that are disabled in the lowsecurity mode.

In some aspects of the general embodiment, the high security input mayinclude a personal identification number.

In another general embodiments, a method for operating a multimodesystem in a retail environment includes: operating in a high securitymode in which a secure input module accepts low security input and highsecurity input, the low security input to be communicated by the secureinput module in plaintext and the high security input to be communicatedby the secure input module in ciphertext; detecting a security breachcondition; and in response to the detecting, operating in a low securitymode in which the secure input module accepts the low security input anddoes not accept the high security input.

Some aspects of the general embodiment may further include selecting thelow security mode from a plurality of low security modes.

Some aspects of the general embodiment may further include operating anon-secure input module which accepts low security input in the lowsecurity mode and in the high security mode.

Some aspects of the general embodiment may further include operating asecond secure input module which accepts low security input and highsecurity input in the low security mode and in the high security mode.

Some aspects of the general embodiment may further include operating acustomer display which displays a limited function message to customerswhen the multimode system is in the low security mode.

In some aspects of the general embodiment, the limited function messagemay include instructions to initiate a transaction at another location.

In some aspects of the general embodiment, the limited function messagemay include a listing of payment types that are disabled in the lowsecurity mode.

In some aspects of the general embodiment, the high security informationmay include a personal identification number.

In another general embodiment, a fuel dispenser includes: a securepayment module (SPM); and a controller, wherein at least one of the SPMand the controller is communicably coupled or includes a processor and atangible memory. The memory stores software comprising instructionsoperable to be executed by the processor to perform operationsincluding: detect a tamper event of the SPM; initiate an adjustment ofthe SPM from a high security mode to a low security mode, wherein theSPM is operable to accept confidential customer information andnon-confidential customer information in the high security mode and theSPM is operable to accept only non-confidential customer information inthe low security mode.

In another general embodiment, a fuel dispenser includes: a securepayment module (SPM) including a secure keypad; and a secure processor.The SPM is operable to function in at least two modes. The SPM isoperable to process non-debit and debit transactions in a first mode,the SPM operable to process only non-debit transactions in a secondmode. The SPM is operable to switch from the first to second mode inresponse to a tamper event.

Various embodiments of a secure input module according to the presentdisclosure may have one or more of the following features. For example,the secure input module may provide for a single input devicefacilitating security controlled input of both encrypted and clear textdata. The secure input module may also provide for display promptcontrol synchronized with an input mode to prevent “spoofing” a customerinto providing sensitive data when a terminal (e.g., a fuel dispenser)may not be protecting that data from exposure (e.g., through encryptionor otherwise). The secure payment module may also provide for acapability to continue to operate and accept payment methods notrequiring sensitive data input (e.g., PIN) and continue to dispenseproduct while disabled. The secure payment module may also provide for acapability to continue to provide media, advertising messages, and otherprompting to consumers while disabled. In addition, the secure paymentmodule may also provide for a capability to continue to sell goods(beyond dispensing, for example, fuel) using payment methods that do notrequire sensitive data input while disabled. The secure payment modulemay also disable all transaction capability after a set period of time,such that a service call will be required to repair/replace the disabledkeypad to restore full secure transaction functionality. Thus the securepayment module may not indefinitely operate in a low security modeindefinitely.

These general and specific aspects may be implemented using a device,system or method, or any combinations of devices, systems, or methods.The details of one or more implementations are set forth in theaccompanying drawings and the description below. Other features,objects, and advantages will be apparent from the description anddrawings, and from the claims.

DESCRIPTION OF DRAWINGS

FIG. 1 is a diagram illustrating one example embodiment of a systemarchitecture for a retail fueling environment;

FIG. 2 illustrates a high-level diagram of an example embodiment forproviding a significant level of security without sacrificingfunctionality for the illustrated embodiment of FIG. 1;

FIG. 3 is a detailed block diagram illustrating an expanded systemarchitecture for the illustrated embodiment of FIG. 1; and

FIG. 4 is a flowchart diagram illustrating an example process executedby one embodiment of the retail environment elements of FIG. 1.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

FIG. 1 illustrates one embodiment of a system architecture for a retailenvironment 105. System 100 includes the retail environment 105, anin-store environment 150, an in-store point-of-sale (POS) server 155, acommunication connection 145 between the retail environment 105 and thein-store POS server 155, and a credit/debit network 165. The system 100may be implemented as a fueling environment, an automated teller machine(ATM), or other unattended payment terminals such as a kiosk or vendingmachine needing to accept both personal identification numbers (PIN) andnon-PIN data entry. In the illustrated embodiment, the retailenvironment 105 is comprised of a plurality of modules, including asecure keypad 115, a display 120, a set of soft keys 125, a card reader130, a receipt printer 135, a barcode scanner 140, and a set ofcontroller electronics 110 that controls each of the aforementionedmodules. Further, each module listed above may be a distinct physicalentity such that independent exchange and replacement of each module ispossible without requiring the exchange or replacement of the entireretail environment 105. In the illustrated embodiment, the POS server155 acts as the master controller to the entire system, while thecontroller electronics 110 act as a slave to the POS server 155. Inother embodiments, the controller electronics 110 may be able to performsome or all of the tasks of the retail environment 105 independently ofthe POS server 155. In some embodiments, a plurality of retailenvironments 105 may exist such that multiple customers may interactwith the system 100 at a given time. One example of a plurality ofretail environments 105 is a fueling environment's frontcourt, whereinmultiple fuel dispensers provide a plurality of drivers with the abilityto refuel and pay at the fueling dispenser simultaneously.

In more advanced retail environments 105, the controller electronics 110may enable and control a VGA screen for playing full-motion video,communicate directly with fueling hydraulics, manage a touch screen, andperform biometric processing, among other actions. Importantly, anadvanced set of controller electronics 110 may provide the retailenvironment 105 with the ability to present multimedia such asadvertising or entertainment, as well as other rich-content forcustomers' consumption. In some embodiments that include an advanced setof controller electronics 110, the operator of the retail system 100, orauthorized third parties, may provide customers with the option topurchase additional goods or services through additional interactionwith the retail environment 105.

The modules of the retail environment 105 are common to systemsaccepting both secure (e.g., PIN data) and non-secure (e.g. zip code)customer information. The retail environment 105 includes a securekeypad 115 for entering the customer information into the system inresponse to appropriate prompts. Depending on the prompt received fromthe controller electronics 110, the secure keypad 115 may acceptinformation provided by the customer to the controller electronics 110as cipher text for sensitive information, or as clear-text fornon-sensitive information. A display 120 is also present in the retailenvironment 105. In the illustrated embodiment, the display 120 is underthe control of the controller electronics 110. To ensure that theprompts shown on the display 120 match the type of entry at the securekeypad 115, the controller electronics 110 can control both modulesconcurrently. If the prompt provided to the display 120 from thecontroller electronics 110 requires input of the confidential customerinformation, the secure keypad 115 ensures that data is encrypted andprovided to the controller electronics 110 so that any unauthorizedparty attempting to intercept the data will find it difficult todetermine the actual value of the customer information provided. Inaddition to the secure keypad 115 and display 120, the retailenvironment 105 includes soft keys 125 that may be programmed tocooperate with a menu presented on the display 120 to facilitateadditional interaction with the customer, a card reader 130 for readingdebit, credit, or smart cards used by customers to pay for the goods andservices purchased, a receipt printer 135 for printing receiptsmemorializing the processed transactions, and a barcode scanner 140 forreading barcode-based information from items such as loyalty cards,coupons, or gift cards.

The in-store environment 150 includes the POS server 155. In the fuelingenvironment, the POS server 155 authorizes customer transactions, suchas fueling, car washes, or other merchant transactions within the store.One or more POS terminals (not pictured) may be available within thein-store environment 150 for use by operators to conduct retailtransactions. These POS terminals are served by the POS server 155. ThePOS server 155, as described above, is the main controller (or computer)that controls and coordinates the activities of the POS system. In someembodiments, more than one POS server 155 may be present within thein-store environment 150.

In the embodiment of FIG. 1, information is exchanged between the retailenvironment 105 and the POS server 155 via the communication line 145(e.g., an RS-485 serial communication line or any other suitable methodof communication line). Due to the security benefits inherent inhard-line communications, a physical connection between the twolocations provides the most security and is the preferred method ofcommunication. However, some embodiments may use a wirelesscommunication link to transfer data between the retail 105 and in-storeenvironments 150.

The in-store environment 150, and specifically the POS server 155, iscommunicably coupled to a credit/debit network 165 to allowauthentication of customers' payment information with the appropriateauthority, such as the Visa or MasterCard networks. Standard methods ofcommunication with those networks may be used to process the customertransactions at the retail environment 105 or at one of the POSterminals. Suitable methods of communication include Ethernet, dial-upconnections, and satellite communication, among others.

Referring now to FIG. 2, there is illustrated a high-level block diagramof a proposed retail environment 200 employing a modular POS terminalconfiguration designed to satisfy security requirements proposed bycertain regulatory and industry agencies. In this configuration, the PED205, the interface device (IFD) 210, the display 220, and the controllerelectronics 215 are physically separate units. Similar to the system ofFIG. 1, the controller electronics 215 control the PED 205, the IFD 210,and the display 220, providing the functionality each requires andcoordinating the interaction between the components.

The PED 205, which includes a secure keypad, contains a secure moduleoperable to encrypt the confidential information (e.g., PIN values inthe illustrated embodiment) received from customers before theinformation is transmitted to the IFD 210. The IFD 210 includes a securemodule in order to decipher the information received from the PED 205.The IFD 210 may include a card reader capable of retrieving informationfrom an integrated circuit card (ICC), a standard debit card, and/or astandard credit card (or other card with a magnetic stripe). If the cardbeing read is an ICC, the IFD 210 may be able to read both theintegrated circuit (IC) embedded in the ICC and the magnetic stripe ofthe card. If the IFD 210 is unable to read and retrieve magnetic stripedata from cards, a separate magnetic stripe reader may be added to thesystem to ensure that standard methods of payment are accepted. Asstated above, the display 220 is controlled by the controllerelectronics 215 and presents prompts and various types of multimedia tocustomers during their interaction with the system. In this design, thedisplay used for the PED 205 can be the same display as the userinterface of the retail environment 200, thereby decreasing the numberof displays necessary from two to one. However, in the illustratedembodiment, the PED 205 is not directly connected to the display 220.Instead, the PED 205 interfaces with the controller electronics 215,which in turn directly connect to the display 220.

FIG. 3 provides a detailed block diagram illustrating an expanded systemarchitecture of the exemplary embodiment of FIG. 1. System 300 focusesprimarily upon the architecture of the retail environment 300,illustrating an embodiment providing enhanced physical security inaddition to an improved level of communications security. The retailenvironment 300 includes a secure keypad 355 and a secure processor 360housed within a secure payment module 305, which is a tamper-resistantand tamper-responsive enclosure used to protect the encryption keys andthe electronics from tampering. The combination of the secure keypad 355and the secure processor 360 is similar to the PED 205 described in FIG.2. The hybrid card reader 365, capable of reading ICCs, debit cards, andcredit cards, is also enclosed within a tamper-resistant andtamper-responsive enclosure 320. By protecting these critical inputdevices, the physical security of the retail environment 300 isenhanced.

In this embodiment, the secure processor 360 and the hybrid card reader365 are communicably connected through a communication line. In someembodiments, the connection may be an RS-232 serial connection usingRJ-45 plugs and jacks. In still other embodiments, the secure processor360 and the hybrid card reader 365 may be co-located in a single module.For instance, the hybrid card reader 365 may be physically locatedwithin the secure payment module 305 to create an even more secureenvironment. The hybrid card reader 365 may act as a slave to the secureprocessor 360, providing it with data received from customer cards.While the connection between the card reader 365 and the processor 360may not be physically secured, sensitive data from the card reader 365may be encrypted prior to transmission to the secure processor 360. Thesecure processor 360 and the card reader 365 may authenticate each otherprior to exchanging information, such as by performing a two-waychallenge authentication procedure. Once trust is established, anysensitive data (e.g., magnetic card data, PINs for smart cardtransactions, or other sensitive data) from the card reader 365 will besent to processor 360 in encrypted format.

Other modules included within the retail environment 300 are similar tothose described in FIGS. 1 and 2. Additional modules may include acontactless antenna 335 for use with radio frequency identification(RFID) tags or other wireless information exchange techniques. Abiometric module 350 may also be included for payment or identificationvia biometric means, such as fingerprint reading or iris scanning. Amiscellaneous module 315 providing additional retail environment 300features may be included as well. An example of possible additionalfeatures may be the iX® Platform Features created by Dresser-Wayne, Inc.for use in fueling environments. A set of soft keys 330 may beprogrammed to supplement the display 120 to allow additional methods ofinteraction with the retail environment, and a receipt printer 340 mayalso be provided for printing receipts. Finally, a barcode reader 345may be present to allow for the reading of barcode-based items such asloyalty cards, coupons, or gift cards. All modules within the retailenvironment 300 are housed in a secure location, such as a fueldispenser cabinet or ATM housing, which is locked and inaccessible fromthe outside, except for maintenance purposes.

Extending from the illustrated embodiment's retail environment 300 aretwo communication lines, a TCP/IP connection 370 and an RS-485 serialconnection 375. The RS-485 serial connection 375 may be used tocommunicate with the POS server 155 and the in-store environment 150.The TCP/IP connection 370 may be used to provide more dynamic data tothe retail environment 300 for which additional bandwidth is necessary,such as multimedia advertising, detailed graphical displays, and similartypes of data. Data sent with the TCP/IP connection 370 may be providedby the retailer and the POS server 155 or a third-party contentprovider. Other connections may interface with the retail environment300 for additional communication lines required or desired by a specificembodiment.

To further secure the retail environment 300, a variety of cryptographictechniques may be used, including public key/private key encryption.Public key/private key encryption provides the ability to encrypt datausing a public key which can only then be decrypted by a receiving partyor component possessing a private key associated with the public key. Apopular public key/private key encryption algorithm is the RSApublic-key cryptography system developed by Ronald L. Rivest, AdiShamir, and Leonard M. Adleman in 1977. The challenge of public-keycryptography is developing a system in which it is extremely difficultto determine the private key. This is accomplished through the use of aone-way function. By using a one-way function it is relatively easy tocompute a result given some initial input values. However, it isextremely difficult to determine the original values starting with theresult. In mathematical terms, given a value x, computing f(x) isrelatively easy. However, given the result f(x), computing x is verydifficult. The one-way function used in the RSA algorithm is amultiplication of prime numbers. It is mathematically simple to multiplytwo large prime numbers, however it is extremely time-consuming tofactor them for most very large primes. Public-key cryptography makesuse of this property of large prime numbers by implementing a systemthat uses two large primes to build a private key, and the product ofthe primes to build a public key. A simplified example of the RSAalgorithm is described as follows:

Key Generation

By selecting two primes, P=11 and Q=23, the RSA algorithm is used togenerate the numbers N, E, and D in the following manner:N=P×Q=11×23=253PHI=(P−1) (Q−1)=220

The public exponent E is calculated so that the greater common divisorof E and PHI is 1. In other words, E is relatively prime with PHI. Forthis example:E=3

In the RSA algorithm, N and E are used as the public keys. The privatekey D is the inverse of E modulo PHI. By using an extended Euclidianalgorithm, the example private key is determined as D=147.

Encryption

To encrypt data, for example a number M=4, the following procedure isused to form an encrypted message C:C=M^E mod N=4^3 mod 253=64

Thus, the example encrypted message is 64.

Decryption

The encrypted message will be decrypted to form a decrypted message Mfrom the encrypted message C using the following procedure:M=C^D mode N=64^147 mode 253=4

thereby recovering the original message data. Although the above exampleused small prime numbers for illustrative purposes, in actual practicethe prime numbers selected for public key/private key cryptography arevery large numbers. In the illustrated embodiment, 2048 bitRSA-cryptography is used. Other known methods, such as theDiffie-Hellman algorithm (DH) or the Data Encryption Standard (DES), maybe used as the method of cryptography in alternative embodiments.

Additionally, digital signatures may be used to authenticate modules andcomponents in the retail environment 300. A digital signature is acryptographic means through which the identity of an originating partymay be verified. Typically, the digital signature is created through theuse of a hash function and encryption using the sending party orcomponent's private key, although other methods may be used. In theillustrated embodiment, a hash function may be applied to a message orset of data (shown as HASH(data)) such that a message digest isgenerated. The message digest allows a message or set of data of anarbitrary length to be reduced to a fixed length. After generating themessage digest using the hash function, the message digest may then beencrypted by the sending party (or component) prior to delivering themessage and the message digest. Upon receipt at the receiving party (orcomponent), the digital signature may be authenticated by decryptingboth the message and message digest, applying an identical hash functionto the message, and comparing the decrypted message digest sent from theoriginating party with the message digest created at the receiver's end.If the message digests are identical, the digital signature isconsidered authenticated. If the two do not match, either a third partyor outside component is attempting to impersonate the originating partyor component, or the message itself has been altered since theoriginating party initially calculated the message digest. In eithercase, a possible security breach has occurred and suitable actionsshould be taken. In the illustrated embodiment, the hash algorithmapplied may be a SHA1 one-way hash resulting in a 160-bit messagedigest. In alternative embodiments, a stronger hash algorithm, such asSHA256, may also be used if desired.

The retail environment 300 and its modules may contain a number ofpublic and private keys and digital signatures. Each embodiment may havea different set of keys and/or signatures according to the actualrequirements of that system. The following chart provides a list of thepertinent keys within the illustrated embodiment of FIG. 3. This list isnot meant to be exhaustive, and includes only those keys pertinent tothe illustrated embodiment. In this example, all public keys other thanthe root certificate authority key are stored in minimal certificateform with a digital signature or chain of signatures that can ultimatelybe traced to the root. Additionally, each certificate may contain thekey type and/or meta information such that key misuse is limited and/oreliminated, allowing each key to be used for only a single purpose.

TABLE 1 Pertinent Cryptographic Keys for FIG. 3 Name DescriptionRootCApub Public key of root CA—used to verify certificates.Self-signed. RootCApriv Matching private key, used to sign certificatesfor other keys. The most critical key to keep secure SPMToCEpub Used bycontroller electronics to verify responses from SPM SPMToCEpriv Used tosign SPM responses to controller electronics CEOSAuthpub Used bycontroller electronics' root trust module to verify controllerelectronics OS image CEOSAuthpriv Used to sign valid controllerelectronics OS images CEAppAuthpub Used by controller electronics OS toverify controller electronics application code CEAppAuthpriv Used tosign valid controller electronics application binaries CEPromptAuthpubUsed by controller electronics application to validate file containingall numbered prompts May be used to authenticate a sub-promptcertificate CEPromptAuthpriv Used to sign file containing prompts May beused to sign a customer prompt certificate. CEBAAuthpub Used withcontroller electronics root trust module to validate it to SPMCEBAAuthpriv Signs valid controller electronics root trust module

Returning to FIG. 3, the controller electronics 325 include threesoftware components used in the operation of the retail environment 300:a secure root trust module 380, an operating system 385, and a set ofapplications 390. The root trust module 380 of FIG. 3 is a softwareprogram or secure chip whose functionality allows the operating system385 to be authenticated upon initialization and startup of the retailenvironment 300. The secure root trust module 380 may be implemented asa flash memory integrated circuit soldered to the controller electronics325. In some instances, the secure root trust module 380 may instead beembodied by a secure chip capable of authenticating various portions ofthe controller electronics 325, including the controller electronics 325itself, in addition to providing identification information that allowsother components to authenticate the controller electronics 325. Theroot trust module 380 may also be implemented in other non-volatilememory that interfaces the controller electronics 325 such as read-onlymemory (ROM), programmable read-only memory (PROM), mask-programmed ROM(MPROM), battery-backed static random access memory (RAM), or a securedigital (SD) card, among others.

In the illustrated embodiment, the operating system 385 of thecontroller electronics 325 may be Microsoft Windows CE, Red Hat (oranother version of) Linux, Unix, or another suitable operating system.The operating system 385 may be stored on a Secure Digital (SD) card,embedded into onboard flash memory, or stored in any other suitablelocation. The operating system 385 is responsible for device drivers,network interfaces, system libraries, and for launching any applications390 for use in the retail environment 300. The applications 390 loadedby the operating system 385 may also be stored on a Secure Digital (SD)card, embedded into the onboard flash memory of the retail environment300, or stored in any other suitable location. The applications 390 maycollectively control all aspects of the display 310 and the retailenvironment interface (i.e., the secure keypad 355, the secure processor360, and the hybrid card reader 365), as well as the communications ofthe controller electronics 325 to other modules and devices.

In this embodiment, the display 310 is not required to be physicallysecure. Due to the logical security implemented between the controllerelectronics 325 and the display 310, and the fact that the display 310is not directly connected to the secure processor 360, the currentsystem is protected from attempts by unauthorized agents to intercept oralter the data meant for presentation on the display 310. Secureinformation regarding customers' PIN numbers or magnetic card data isnot provided to the display 310 from the controller electronics 325.Instead, that information is sent via the secure communications linkbetween the controller electronics 325 and the secure payment module305. Additionally, information transmitted between the secure paymentmodule 305 and the controller electronics 325 is encrypted such thatoutside agents attempting to intercept the data would find understandingthe information extremely difficult and time-consuming. Because thedisplay 310 is not physically secured to the retail environment 300,exchanging the display 310 with a new model becomes a simple andinexpensive task, saving operators time and costs. Additionally, thedisplay 310 does not need to include a secure chip, nor will the retailenvironment 300 require a redesign to enhance its security.

In order to add a level of security to software stored in the controllerelectronics 325, some embodiments may allow onlycryptographically-authenticated software to be run. In effect, a trustmodel may be developed to ensure that all software present in the retailenvironment 300 is authentic. In the illustrated embodiment, the trustmodel may rely upon digital signatures to authenticate the software. Ifsoftware attempts to load that does not have a digital signature, or thedigital signature it does have is not recognized, the software will notbe allowed to run. In order to ensure a secure system, the digitalsigning of all software may be performed in a secure environment. In oneembodiment, the secure environment may employ a process of dual control(split knowledge) when performing cryptographic functions. Additionally,appropriate review procedures should be followed prior tocryptographically signing the software.

With regards to the trust model, cryptographic components may beembedded within the secure root trust module 380, such that the roottrust module 380 may cryptographically authenticate the operatingsystems 385. Additionally, cryptographic data allowing other componentsto authenticate the secure root trust module 380 may also be embeddedtherein. The following components, among others, may be embedded withinthe root trust module 380 in some embodiments:

1. RootCApub certificate;

2. CEOSAuthpub certificate;

3. CEBAAuthpub certificate; and

4. E_(CEBAAuthpriv)(HASH(root trust module contents)).

Referring to Table 1 above, the RootCApub certificate may represent thepublic key of the root certificate authority and may be used to verifyother certificates. In other embodiments, the RootCAPub certificate maynot be embedded within the secure root trust module 380. In thoseinstances, other digital signatures may be used to chain validate theorigin and authenticity of the root trust module 380. Next, theCEOSAuthpub certificate may be used to verify the operating system image385 being loaded. In some instances, the CEOSAuthpub certificate may notbe embedded within the root trust module 380. Instead, the certificatemay be contained in the operating system binary code may beauthenticated using the RootCApub certificate to establish trust. ThisCEOSAuthopub certificate may then be used to authenticate the operatingsystem image. The CEBAAuthpub certificate may be used by the securemodules to validate the root trust module 380. The final componentlisted, E_(CEBAAuthpriv)(HASH(root trust module contents)), representsthe digital signature of the secure root trust module 380 as encryptedwith the CEBAAuthpriv certificate. The root trust module contents arehashed by a specific hash algorithm to generate a unique digitalfingerprint. After hashing the contents, the fingerprint is encryptedusing the CEBAAuthpriv certificate, the private key associated with theroot trust module 380. A component attempting to authenticate the roottrust module may use the root trust module's public key, CEBAAuthpub, todecrypt the value. Using the identical hash algorithm, HASH(root trustmodule contents) may be calculated. If, after comparing the decryptedhash value and the calculated hash value, the values are identical, theroot trust module 380 may be considered authenticated.

Operating systems 385 loaded onto the controller electronics 325 mayneed to be digitally signed before allowed to run. The digital signaturemay be stamped on the operating system binary, and may be computed withE_(CEOSAuthpriv)(HASH(OS contents)). Using the embedded cryptographiccomponents, the root trust module 380 may authenticate these operatingsystems by extracting the operating system's digital signature andcomparing it to the calculated hash value. The hash value of theoperating system may be decrypted using the root trust module's 380embedded public key value, CEOSAuthpub. Once decrypted, HASH(OSContents) may be compared to the calculated hash value of the operatingsystem contents. If the values are identical, then the operating systemis authenticated and may be booted. If the values do not match, theoperating system is not booted and in some embodiments, an error isreported.

Just as the root trust module 380 verifies the authenticity of theoperating system 385 before it allows the operating system to start, theoperating system 385 must verify the authenticity of the applications390 that are contained outside the operating system 385 image. Before anapplication 390 can execute, the operating system 385 may call a specialloader function to determine whether the module is allowed to load. Atthat time, the operating system 385 can generate the value ofHASH(Application Contents). This value can then be compared to theD_(CEAppAuthpub)(Application digital signature), the value of theApplication digital signature decrypted by the public key CEAppAuthpub.If the values match, then the application 390 will be allowed to load.If they do not match, the operating system 385 will not load thatapplication 390. Each application 390 that is to be run on thecontroller electronics 325 and is not embedded into the operating system385 image must be digitally signed before being allowed to run. Thedigital signature may be stamped onto the Application binary, and may becomputed with E_(CEAppAuthpriv)(HASH(Application Contents)).

Finally, authorized applications 390 may be responsible for verifyingthe authenticity of a package of on-screen prompts to be sent to display310 for viewing by the customer. Screen displays, information requests,and/or other content that will be provided to the display 310 and insome instances, values showing whether any requested keypad entry shouldbe in secure or non-secure mode, may be stored within a data file 395.The data file 395 may be stored on a Secure Digital (SD) card, flashmemory, or other suitable forms of volatile or non-volatile memory thatmay be coupled to the controller electronics 325. In some embodiments,the data files 395 may be an XML file, a simple text file, or any otherfile format compatible with the operating system 380 and theapplications 390 accessing the file 395. Data prompts within the datafile 395 may be textual, graphical, or consist of binary blobsdescribing how the prompt is to operate, in addition to other suitableformats. In some embodiments, the data file 395 can be digitally signedwith the signature E_(CEPromptAuthpriv)(HASH((prompt file)). When theapplication 390 requests that the secure payment module 305 performconfidential or non-confidential data entry, the application 390 mayverify the digital signature of the data file 395 before displaying theprompts on the display 310 and enabling the secure keypad 355 to allowdata entry. The verification process may be performed by comparing thevalue of HASH(prompt file) to D_(CEPromptAuthpub)(prompt file digitalsignature). If the values match, the prompt file may be authenticatedand the prompts provided to the display. If the values do not match, theprompts may not be displayed and appropriate security notificationsshould be made to check for potential unauthorized access. In otherinstances, if the values do not match, the prompt may still be presentedat the display 310, although the secure keypad 355 may be disabled toavoid entry of confidential data while the secure payment module 305 isin a non-secure state. Alternatively, a customer prompt key pair may besubstituted for the CEPromptAuth key pair. In this embodiment, thecustomer prompt public key must be signed by CEPromptAuthpriv togenerate the prompt certificate. Before the certificate is issued, thecustomer's security procedures must be reviewed to ensure that thecertificate will be kept secure after issuance. Thus, for the securekeypad 355 to be enabled, the prompt file must be digitally signed andauthenticated.

Having performed the authentication of the software on the controllerelectronics 325, the components of the secure payment module 305 and thecontroller electronics 325 must validate each other as legitimate andtrusted devices before full operation of the retail environmentcommences. First, the controller electronics 325 must validate thesecure keypad 355 and secure processor 360 within secure payment module305 (collectively referred to as “SPM 305”) before the controllerelectronics' software completes its startup sequence. In someembodiments, validation of the SPM's 305 identity may take placeimplicitly by the establishment of a session key with the SPM 305. Byverifying that the SPM 305 can establish a link with session-levelencryption, the SPM 305 may verify that it can sign a challenge from thecontroller electronics 325 with SPMToCEpub. Because the SPM certificatefor SPMToCEpub is authenticated by the root certificate authority, itmay be considered a legitimate module. A further description ofestablishing a secure communications channel/link between the SPM 305and the controller electronics 325 is discussed with relation to FIG. 4.

Continuing the mutual authentication, the SPM 305 must validate thecontroller electronics 325 before the secure keypad 355 may becontrolled by the controller electronics 325. To validate the controllerelectronics 325, the initial handshake with the SPM 305 from thecontroller electronics 325 may include sending a copy of the root trustmodule 380. The SPM 305 can determine the hash value for the root trustmodule 380 after the module is received. The SPM 305 can also extractthe digital signature of the root trust module 380. The SPM 305 may alsoextract the CEBAAuthpub certificate from the secure root trust module380. First, the CEBAAuthpub certificate may be validated with a copy ofRootCApub stored within the SPM 305. In other embodiments, theCEBAAuthpub certificate may be chain validated using other certificatessigned by the root certificate authority. If the CEBAAuthpub certificateis cryptographically authenticated, the CEBAAuthpub certificate may beused to verify the digital signature of the root trust module 380. Ifthe computed hash of the root trust module 380 matchesD_(CEBAAuthpub)(Root trust module Digital Signature), then the roottrust module 380 may be considered cryptographically authenticated.After authentication, further commands may be sent to the SPM 305. Insome alternative embodiments, the controller electronics 325 may includea secure chip or processor that can perform a two-way authenticationwith the SPM 305. In those embodiments, the secure chip or processor mayperform the authentication techniques necessary to create the securecommunications link between the controller electronics 325 and the SPM305.

FIG. 4 is a flowchart diagram illustrating an example process executedby the retail environment 105 elements of FIG. 1. The design of retailenvironment 105 provides multiple security modes of operationappropriate for use depending on the security conditions of the retailenvironment 105. For clarity, FIG. 4 is described for a retailenvironment 105 with one module. For retail environments with more thanone terminal module, FIG. 4 applies to a single module.

The retail environment 105 is initialized for operation in a highsecurity mode at 405. For example, the high security mode can be thedefault mode of the retail environment 105 which is entered into uponnormal boot or power on sequence. The high security mode can enable allfunctionality desired for the retail environment 105, includingaccepting both sensitive information (e.g., PIN information) andnon-sensitive information (e.g., zip code or phone number information)from a customer through the secure keypad 115. The sensitive informationcan be enciphered by the secure keypad 115 and provided to thecontroller electronics 110 as cipher text, and non-sensitive informationcan be provided by the secure keypad 115 to the controller electronics110 as clear-text. For example, a customer debit transaction can requirethe customer to enter a PIN, which is sensitive information, through thesecure keypad 115. An example credit card transaction can requireanother customer to enter ZIP code information, which is non-sensitiveinformation, through the secure keypad 115.

The retail environment 105 detects a security breach event at 410. Forexample, a motion detector in the secure keypad 115 or retailenvironment 105 can detect a motion event indicating unauthorizedaccess, or the state of the retail environment software can becompromised in such a way as to reduce assurance of proper handling ofsensitive information. In some cases, the security breach may be due toan error in software, firmware, or hardware, rather than a purposefulbreach for obtaining confidential or secure information.

In response to the security breach event, the retail environment 105transitions to a low security mode at 415. In one example, the securekeypad 115 may be disabled to accept secure information such as a debittransaction PIN, or the retail environment 105 can be disabled toinitiate a transaction that requires secure information. In anotherexample, the retail environment can halt all retail environment 105transactions and instruct customers to pay in the in-store environment150. The retail environment 105 can continue operations that require noinformation, such as dispensing a product paid for at a POS terminal,and/or can continue operations that require non-secure information butno secure information, such as a credit card transaction. The idlecontents of the display 120 can be altered to alert customers that someor all functionality is unavailable. For example, a message describingthe limited functionality and the default idle contents can bealternated on the display 120.

The retail environment 105 begins a maintenance countdown at 420. Duringthe maintenance countdown, the retail environment 105 can operate in thelow security mode and send one or more notifications to the POS terminal115 or other components. The alert is a notification that the retailenvironment 105 is operating in a low security mode, and can include thetime left in the maintenance countdown. The maintenance countdown can beconfigured to permit use of the retail environment 105 for a limitedtime while maintenance is requested, but limited to such a length as toprevent long term usage of the retail environment 105 in a low securitymode.

If the end of the maintenance countdown is reached without anymaintenance intervention, the retail environment 105 transitions at 430to a terminated functionality mode at 425. For example, some or allfunctionality available in the low security mode is terminated until theretail environment 105 receives a maintenance intervention. For anexample low security mode that permits credit card transactions andproduct dispensing, credit card transaction functionality can beterminated, but product dispensing functionality can be continued fortransactions completed at a POS terminal. For an example low securitymode that permits only product dispensing, all functionality of theretail environment 105 can be terminated. In other embodiments, once themaintenance countdown is reached without any maintenance interventionand the retail environment 105 transitions at 430 to a terminatedfunctionality mode at 425, all functionality at the retail environment105 is terminated. For instance, the retail environment 105 may displaya message indicating that there has been a system failure and serviceand/or maintenance should be contacted.

A maintenance intervention event can be detected by the retailenvironment 105 at 435. For example maintenance personnel can enter apasscode through the secure keypad 115, input a maintenance card in thecard reader 130, or unlock a maintenance door in the retail environment105. Additionally, the maintenance personnel can diagnose, reset and/orrepair the retail environment 105 as appropriate. If the maintenancepersonnel is able to successfully repair 430 the retail environment 105,the retail environment 105 resumes operation in the high security modeat 405.

If the maintenance personnel is unable to successfully repair the retailenvironment 105, the retail environment 105 resumes operation in the lowsecurity mode and an additional maintenance countdown can be started at430. The number and length of additional maintenance countdowns canvary, and can be pre-determined or set by maintenance personnel or theoperator of the retail environment 105. For example, the countdown maybe set to 14 days, 10 days, or other periods of time which may be longeror shorter.

Two example low security modes were briefly described above, and will befurther described here. These low security modes are labeled 1 and 2 forclarity, but are not intended to suggest an order or ranking. Other lowsecurity modes are possible.

Low security mode 1 is designed to prevent any data entry by a customerthrough the secure keypad 115. This low security mode may be appropriatefor use in meeting the requirement of standards that require terminatingall function of a compromised PIN data entry device, such as theEuropay, MasterCard, Visa (EMV) standard or the Unattended PaymentTerminal (UPT) standard. When a security breach event is detected, thecontroller electronics 110 informs the POS server 155 via an XML messageand displays a generic message on the display 120 to indicate thattransactions at the retail environment 105 are disabled and the customermay pay at a POS terminal in the in-store environment 150. Additionally,the display 120 can show non-secure prompts to a customer, such aspre-fueling messages, fueling messages and post fueling messages in thecase of a gas pump. Some or all of the elements of the retailenvironment 105 are disabled, such as the secure keypad 115 and the cardreader 130. The SPM 305 will not initiate a secure action while in theexample low security mode 1.

The following elements of the retail environment 105 may be workable inlow security mode 1:

-   -   Barcode Scanner 140    -   Receipt Printer 135    -   Soft Keys 125    -   Display 120

In some examples, the SPM 305 is responsible for detecting some or allsecurity breach events and reporting them to the controller electronics110. At boot, the controller electronics 110 can output through display120 a message such as “Terminal Security Breach—Call for Service” orsimilar message until such time as the controller electronics 110updates the screen for the non-secure prompts described above. Thecontroller electronics 110 allows “pay inside” type transactions where acustomer pays at a POS terminal in the in-store environment 150 for aproduct to be dispensed in the retail environment 105. Functionality forMACing, authentication, and encryption may not be supported in theexample low security mode 1.

One or more events can be registered with the POS server 155, such aswhen successfully entering the low security mode 1 or a failed attemptto enter the low security mode 1.

Low security mode 2 may be designed to prevent secure information frombeing input to the retail environment 105 while still permittingnon-secure information being input. For example, information which mustbe enciphered, such as PINs, is prevented from input, but informationwhich may be communicated in clear-text, such as telephone numbers andZIP codes, is permitted. This low security mode may be appropriate foruse in meeting the requirement of standards that require terminatingonly secure information functions of a compromised PIN data entrydevice, such as the Encrypting PIN Pad (EPP) standard. Transactionsrequiring only clear-text, such as fleet card usage, credit cardtransactions, or customer loyalty card entry may still be possible inlow security mode 2.

When a security breach event is detected, the controller electronics 110informs the POS server 155 via an XML message and displays a message onthe display 120 to indicate that some (e.g., PIN/debit) transactions atthe retail environment 105 are disabled and the customer may pay withsome transaction types in the retail environment 105, or with anytransaction type at a POS terminal in the in-store environment 150. TheSPM 305 may not initiate a secure action while in the example lowsecurity mode 2.

The following elements of the retail environment 105 may be workable inlow security mode 2:

-   -   Card Reader 130    -   Barcode Scanner 140    -   Receipt Printer 135    -   Soft Keys 125    -   Secure Keypad 115—Both function keys and non-encrypted data        entry, such as ZIP code or phone number.

The SPM 305 may operate according to the following rules in low securitymode 2:

-   -   Once the SPM 305 is breached, the SPM 305 may report that status        to the controller electronics 110.    -   The SPM 305 may require a command to enable low security mode 2.        This may turn off authentication and encryption capabilities for        the secure keypad 115 and associated interfaces and fall back on        plain-text communication.    -   After the SPM 305 is breached, the SPM 305 may track whether        this special mode is available, and the time for which it is        available.    -   When powered, the SPM 305 may program a reservable area in flash        details on this mode. Periodically, bits may be programmed to        indicate that “xx” many hours have gone by. When the bits fill        up, the SPM 305 may no longer allow entry into this low security        mode.    -   The SPM 305 may only allow limited functionality operation for a        limited window (e.g., 14 days). Once expired, intervention may        be required with the controller electronics 110 again to restart        the window counter for the same or a different window.    -   The secure keypad 115 and card reader 130 may continue to        function, except for receiving secure information.

The controller electronics 110 may operate according to the followingrules in low security mode 2:

-   -   Messages may be displayed on the display 120 at boot, upon        initial security breach, or expiration of the initial window        indicating “Terminal Security Breach—Call for Service” or        similar message, but will allow the soft key 125 combination for        entry into limited functionality mode. This can be activated by        site personnel with assistance of a help desk. Alternatively,        this can be controlled remotely via the POS server 155.    -   Run time diagnostics may show how many days the SPM 305 has been        operating in low security mode 2.    -   If this mode is entered, the controller 110 may try to negotiate        with SPM 305 to sync into this mode. When this mode is entered,        the controller electronics 110 may report a successful event to        the POS server 155 and enable low security mode 2. If this mode        can't be entered, the controller electronics 110 may issue a        failure message to the POS server 155 and block any normal        transaction. The message at this time may revert to the terminal        security breach message as above to allow for “pay inside”        transactions.    -   If this mode is entered, the controller electronics 110 may        allow non-secure transaction with the card reader 130, the        receipt printer 135, barcode scanner 140, a bill acceptor (not        shown), the soft keys 125, the display 120 and the secure keypad        115 (only in non-encrypted mode).    -   The controller electronics 110 may block issuance of “enable        PIN” command (return false and disable the secure keypad 115).

Exceptions to low security mode 2:

-   -   Low security mode 2 is supported with non-secure card reader        130, or with a secure card reader 130 that can function in a        non-secure mode.

The retail environment 105 can store setting information to operate inlow security modes 1, 2, and/or other low security modes. Upondeployment, boot up, or at other times, the retail environment can beconfigured to enter one of the possible low security modes upon securitybreach. This configuration can be set or changed by a technician at theretail location 105 using input elements such as the secure keypad 115,the card reader 130, and the soft keys 125. The low securityconfiguration can be set by a remote technician or a technician in thein-store environment via the POS server 155. When presenting thetechnician with prompts for setting low security configurations, the lowsecurity modes can be labeled and organized numerically, as describedhere; by an associated security standard; or by geographic region (e.g.,country), where each region is associated with one or more securitystandards in use in that region.

In some examples, the retail environment enters a selected low securitymode upon detection of any security breach. In these examples, a retailenvironment enters the same low security mode upon detection of a deviceremoval or tamper event for any device, a loss of state event for thecontroller electronics 110, and a failed authentication event betweenthe retail environment 105 and the POS server 155.

In some other examples, the retail environment enters different lowsecurity modes depending on the type of security breach detected. Forexample, a retail environment 105 with a card reader 130 that acceptsboth secure and non-secure information as well as a secure keypad 115that accepts both secure and non-secure information, can differentiatedevice removal or tamper events associated with either the secure keypad115 or the card reader 130. Upon detection of a tamper event associatedwith the secure keypad 115, the retail environment can enter a lowsecurity mode that restricts secure input to the secure keypad 115, butthat permits secure input to the card reader 130. Upon detection of atamper event associated with the card reader 130, the retail environmentcan enter a low security mode that restricts secure input to the cardreader 130, but that permits secure input to the keypad 115.

While the preceding flowchart and accompanying descriptions illustrateexemplary processes, the retail environment contemplates using orimplementing any suitable technique for performing these and othertasks. It will be understood that these methods are for illustrationpurposes only and that the described or similar techniques may beperformed at any appropriate time, including concurrently, individually,or in combination. In addition, many of the steps in these flowchartsmay take place simultaneously and/or in different orders than as shown.Moreover, the retail environment may use methods with additional steps,fewer steps, and/or different steps, so long as the process remainsappropriate. Thus, the above description of example embodiments does notdefine or constrain the disclosure. Other changes, substitutions, andalterations are possible without departing from the spirit and scope ofthis disclosure, and such changes, substitutions, and alterations may beincluded within the scope of the claims included herewith.

What is claimed is:
 1. A system, comprising: a card reader; a keypad; aprocessor configured to encrypt data manually input to the keypad and toencrypt information read by the card reader; and a controller configuredto transition the system between a high security mode and a low securitymode, determine when security of the system has been breached, andtransition the system from the high security mode to the low securitymode in response to determining that the security of the system has beenbreached; wherein in the high security mode the card reader is enabledto read a customer card, the keypad is enabled to accept manual input ofunsecure information and to accept manual input of secure information,the controller is enabled to receive the encrypted data and theencrypted information, and the controller is enabled to process a retailtransaction using the encrypted data and the encrypted information; andwherein in the low security mode the card reader is enabled to read acustomer card, the keypad is enabled to accept manual input of unsecureinformation and is disabled from accepting the manual input of secureinformation, the controller is enabled to receive the encrypted data andthe encrypted information, and the controller is enabled to process aretail transaction using the encrypted data and the encryptedinformation.
 2. The system of claim 1, wherein in each of the highsecurity mode and the low security mode the card reader is enabled toreceive secure information and unsecure information from a customercard.
 3. The system of claim 1, wherein in the high security mode thecard reader is enabled to receive secure information and unsecureinformation from a customer card, and in the low security mode the cardreader is enabled to receive unsecure information from a customer cardand is disabled from receiving secure information from a customer card.4. The system of claim 1, wherein the controller is configured totransition the system from the low security mode to the high securitymode in response to maintenance that addresses the breach beingperformed on the system.
 5. The system of claim 1, wherein thecontroller is configured to transition the system from the low securitymode to a terminated functionality mode in response to maintenance thataddresses the breach not being performed on the system within apredetermined amount of time after the transition from the high securitymode to the low security mode.
 6. The system of claim 5, wherein in theterminated functionality mode the keypad is disabled from accepting anyinformation.
 7. The system of claim 5, wherein the system includes afuel dispensing system configured to dispense fuel therefrom, anautomated teller machine, or an unattended payment terminal configuredto accept payment for at least one of a good and a service.
 8. A system,comprising: a card reader; a processor; and a controller configured totransition the system between a high security mode and a low securitymode, determine when security of the system has been breached, andtransition the system from the high security mode to the low securitymode in response to determining that the security of the system has beenbreached; wherein in the high security mode the card reader is enabledto read a customer card to accept input of secure information andunsecure information, and the processor is enabled to encrypt datareceived by the card reader and transmit the encrypted data to thecontroller to process a retail transaction; and wherein in the lowsecurity mode the card reader is enabled to read a customer card toaccept unsecure information from the card reader and is disabled fromaccepting the input of secure information, and the processor is enabledto encrypt data received by the card reader and transmit the encrypteddata to the controller to process a retail transaction.
 9. The system ofclaim 8, further comprising a keypad, wherein in the high security modethe keypad is enabled to accept manual input of unsecure informationfrom a customer and to accept manual input of secure information from acustomer, and in low security mode the keypad is enabled to accept themanual input of unsecure information and is disabled from accepting themanual input of secure information.
 10. The system of claim 9, whereinin the high and low security modes the processor is enabled to encryptthe information received by the keypad and transmit the encryptedinformation to the controller.
 11. The system of claim 8, wherein thecontroller is configured to transition the system from the low securitymode to the high security mode in response to maintenance that addressesthe breach being performed on the system.
 12. The system of claim 8,wherein the controller is configured to transition the system from thelow security mode to a terminated functionality mode in response tomaintenance that addresses the breach not being performed on the systemwithin a predetermined amount of time after the transition from the highsecurity mode to the low security mode.
 13. The system of claim 12,further comprising a keypad, wherein in the terminated functionalitymode the keypad is disabled from accepting any information.
 14. Thesystem of claim 8, wherein the system includes a fuel dispensing systemconfigured to dispense fuel therefrom, an automated teller machine, oran unattended payment terminal configured to accept payment for at leastone of a good and a service.
 15. A method, comprising: detecting abreach of security in a system configured to accept payment for at leastone of a good and a service; in response to the detection of the breach,switching from a first mode of operating the system to a second mode ofoperating the system, the system in the first mode being configured toaccept unsecure information input to the system via a card reader, toaccept secure information input via the card reader, to encrypt theaccepted unsecure and secure information, and to transmit the encryptedunsecure and secure information to a controller to process a retailtransaction, and the system in the second mode being configured toaccept unsecure information input to the system via the card reader, todisable input of secure information via the card reader, to encrypt theaccepted unsecure information, and to transmit the encrypted unsecureinformation to the controller to process a retail transaction; startinga count of an amount of time when the system switches from the firstmode to the second mode; determining whether maintenance of the systemoccurs before the count reaches a predetermined amount of time; andswitching from the second mode to the first mode in response to themaintenance of the system being determined to have occurred before thecount reaches the predetermined amount of time.
 16. The method of claim15, further comprising switching from the second mode to a third mode ofoperating the system in response to the maintenance of the system beingdetermined to have not occurred before the count reaches thepredetermined amount of time, the system in the third mode beingconfigured to disable input of unsecure information via the card readerand to disable input of secure information via the card reader.
 17. Themethod of claim 15, wherein in the first mode a keypad of the system isenabled to accept manual input of unsecure information from a customerand to accept manual input of secure information from a customer, and inthe second mode the keypad is enabled to accept the manual input ofunsecure information and is disabled from accepting the manual input ofthe secure information.
 18. The method of claim 17, further comprising,in the first and second modes, encrypting the information received bythe keypad and transmitting the encrypted information to the controllerto process a retail transaction.
 19. The method of claim 15, wherein thecontroller detects the breach, switches from the first mode to thesecond mode, starts the count, determines whether the maintenance of thesystem occurs, and switches from the second mode to the first mode. 20.The method of claim 15, wherein the system includes at least one of afuel dispensing system, an unattended payment terminal configured toaccept user payment for at least one of a good and a service, and anautomated teller machine.